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At the epicenter of maintaining the finest, most professional, and most feared 
military in the world is the quality of its leaders. The United States Marine Corps’ Officer 
Corps is the standard bearer, with an accession pipeline more rigorous than any in the 
Department of Defense. As is the historical norm, however, the U.S. military undertakes 
ambitious increases to end strength in the wake of a prolonged conflict. As a conflict 
fades, the increased end strength is no longer warranted. The typical approach during the 
drawdown is to reduce accessions, create stricter retention policies, and entice members 
to leave the service through voluntary measures. 
This research identifies the trade-off between quantity and quality necessitated by 
end-strength changes. Quantitative analysis using a difference-in-differences research 
design shows, relative to the buildup, officer quality increases during the drawdown. In 
particular, combat and non-combat occupations have a 0.0321 and 0.0834 point increase, 
respectively, in FITREP scores in the drawdown compared to the control group. 
Alternative measures and additional robustness checks support the hypothesis that the 
drawdown yields higher-quality officers. It is imperative to adapt force-shaping policies 
to a gradual approach to ensure the Marines retained during the buildup meet the quality 
standards of the drawdown.  
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In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the United States declared a Global War 
on Terrorism (GWOT), which shifted military focus toward operations against 
organizations deemed “terrorist” as well as regimes accused of supporting them. 
President George W. Bush ordered strikes in Afghanistan in October 2001 and again in 
Iraq in March 2003 (“Timelines,” 2013). This two-front war required vast resources and 
manpower. Figure 1 displays the manpower levels throughout the wars summed across 
all U.S. military services. By 2013, President Obama declared the GWOT over 
(Shinkman, 2013). 
Figure 1.  Boots on the Ground Iraq and Afghanistan 
 
Adapted from Belasco, A. (2009). Troop levels in the Afghan and Iraq wars, FY2001–FY2012: Cost and 
other potential issues (CRS Report No. R40682). Retrieved from https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/ 
natsec/R40682.pdf  
Building up and maintaining the military manpower required to fight a two-front 
war is not costless. Manpower expenditures typically comprise over 25 percent of the 
annual appropriations of the Department of Defense (DOD). Figure 2 portrays the costs 
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of military personnel (MILPERS) within the United States Marin Corps’ (USMC) 
budget; interestingly, the MILPERS spent per Marine increases with the end strength. 
Given fiscal constraints, trade-offs between quantity and quality of troops were likely 
inevitable during the GWOT buildup and subsequent drawdown. This thesis is an 
empirical investigation of the quantity-quality trade-off among USMC officers during the 
buildup and drawdown. 
Figure 2.  USMC Military Personnel (MILPERS) 
 
Adapted from Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller). 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2015. Defense budget materials FY2004–FY2016: Military personnel programs (M-
1). Retrieved from http://comptroller.defense.gov/BudgetMaterials.aspx#summary and adapted from 
Budget of the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps from fiscal year 2000 to 2016 (in billion U.S. 
dollars). (2016). Statista. Retrieved from http://www.statista.com/statistics/239290/budget-of-the-us-
navy-and-the-us-marine-corps/  
In February 2007, General James Conway, 34th Commandant of the Marine 
Corps (CMC), published All Marine Corps Activities 008/07 (USMC, 2008c), titled 
Marine Corps End Strength Increase. His intent was to inform all Marines that the 
president approved his plan to expand the USMC end strength from 175,000 Marines to 
202,000. General Conway’s plan to grow the force predated President Bush’s decision to 
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deploy surge forces to Iraq (USMC, 2008c). With an extended two-front war looming, it 
was even more important to grow the force. 
Growing any organization by more than 15 percent is a daunting task. Growing a 
professional military by 15 percent is even more difficult. The support required to train 
and equip a service member is extensive and costly. However, it is much easier to grow a 
force rapidly than it is to downsize the force in a quick, fair manner, and with the quality 
demanded by the military. The Corps’ initial goal was to reach an end strength of 
202,000 by fiscal year (FY) 2011; the goal was attained two years early (Sneden, 2009). 
At its peak, officer end strength was 22,094 (USMC History Division, 2014). Figure 3 
depicts a chart of USMC officer end strength from 1990 to 2014. The 1990s represents 
the last occurrence of a drawdown, which happened during President Clinton’s 
administration.  
Figure 3.  USMC Officer End Strength 1990–2014 
 




The USMC end strength was initially in flux once it was determined to drawdown 
the force. According to research conducted by the Sustainable Task Force, the Marine 
Corps could have been reduced to 175,000 Marines (Lamothe, 2010). Instead, the 
Pentagon determined that the Marine Corps could maintain an end strength of 184,000 
for FY16 (Sisk, 2015). It appears that the consensus is to maintain the force near FY16 
levels for the foreseeable future.  
Numerous policy alternatives are available to reduce the size of the force. 
Reduction methods include reduced accessions, reduced retention, offering early 
retirement incentives, not honoring obligatory contracts with service members, and using 
any combination of the methods. This study is not intended to evaluate the methods, but 
more information can be found in the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) study Right-
Sizing the Force (Rostker, 2013). The Marine Corps decided to do a combination of all 
methods, except for not honoring contracts.  
1. Career Designation 
Title 10 U.S. Code requires that almost every abled officer be retained and 
promoted to the rank of captain. An officer is promoted to captain at four to five years of 
time in service and to major only after nine to 10 years of service. The USMC created the 
career designation (CD) board to retain the highest quality officers at the rank of captain. 
This creates a retention milestone sooner than the nine-to-ten-year mark corresponding 
with promotion to major. CD serves as another tool to shape the force outside of the 
gradual approach in Title 10.  
Essentially, the CD board is a promotion-style board that reviews eligible officers 
and determines if their future service is in the best interest of the USMC. To be eligible 
for competitive CD, an officer must attain multiple prerequisites, but the four most 
pertinent as listed in MARADMIN 021/09 are: 
1. Unrestricted officer in the active component.  
2. 540-days of observed FITREP time. Officers can verify their observed 
FITREP time by contacting the Manpower Management Support Branch 
(MMSB). 
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3. An officer’s first opportunity for career designation consideration will 
coincide with that officer being in the promotion zone for the captain 
promotion selection board. Officers who do not meet the 540-day 
observed time requirement when in-zone for Captain will be considered 
for career designation at a subsequent board after achieving 540-days 
observed time. 
4. Officers will be granted at least one opportunity to be considered for 
career designation. Officers with an Expiration of Active Service (EAS) 
that does not support at least one opportunity for career designation must 
request (via AA form) an extension on active duty to be considered. 
(USMC, 2010a) 
Prior to the drawdown, CD was nearly a guarantee since it was not a competitive 
process. Fighting a two-front war required the USMC to retain every abled body to 
achieve its mission and to attain the congressionally mandated 202,000 end strength. 
General Conway, CMC, decided that returning to competitive CD would assist in 
reducing the size of the Corps. As stated in the prescribed Marine Administration 
Message 021/09 (USMC, 2010a), “Career Designation is a force-shaping tool that allows 
for the management of the officer population by retaining the best qualified officers from 
each year group. Those selected for Career Designation are offered the opportunity to 
remain on active duty” (USMC, 2010a). Essentially, competitive CD is a method to 
prescriptively shape the force outside of mandated Title 10 requirements.  
Figure 4 is derived from CD board results from FY10 to FY15. For CD boards, 
Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) are normally placed into five competitive 
categories: combat arms, combat service support, aviation support, aviation, and law. 
Given this study’s research design (discussed later in more detail), these groups were 
merged into three. The group referred to as “control” is the combination of aviation and 
law. The first experimental or “treatment” group is combat arms. The second is the non-
combat group and consists of combat service support and aviation support. Figure 4 
shows that CD selection was highly likely for these groups around 2010. With the 
drawdown from an officer end strength over 22,000 and competitive CD, the combat and 
non-combat groups reached a low CD percentage of 55 percent in FY13–FY14, as seen 
in Figure 4.  
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Figure 4.  CD by MOS Groups 
 
Adapted from Johnson, J. A. (2015). Significant pre-accession factors predicting success or failure 
during a Marine Corps officer’s initial service obligation. Manuscript submitted for publication at Naval 
Postgraduate School. 
The CD board and captain promotion board are not an integrated process. The CD 
board is conducted semi-annually in February and August, while the captain promotion 
board is conducted annually in February. Title 10 U.S. Code requires that all fully 
qualified first lieutenants eligible for promotion shall be promoted to captain. Since 
captains are required to be promoted 100 percent by law it becomes very difficult to 
quickly reduce the officer corps. Figure 5 displays the DOD Instruction 1320.13 (DOD, 
2014) that enforces Title 10 and shows the desired timing and opportunity for promotion 
into the ranks of major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel. CD benefits the Marine Corps 
because it allows the number of officers to be reduced before they reach promotion zone 
for major.  
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Figure 5.  Field Grade Promotion Timing and Opportunity 
 
Source: Department of Defense. (2014, October 30). Commissioned Officer Promotion Reports (DOD 
Instruction 1320.13). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/132013p.pdf 
2. Fitness Reports 
The FITREP is the most important evaluation tool for Marine Corps officers. 
“The FITREP provides the primary means for evaluating a Marine’s performance to 
support the Commandant’s efforts to select the best qualified personnel for promotion, 
career designation, retention, resident schooling, command, and duty assignments” 
(USMC, 2015, p. 2). To meet career milestones it is imperative that a Marine’s 
FITREPSs are current, accurate, and most importantly competitive relative to his/her 
peers. FITREPS are important for all Marines, but even more so for young officers. As 
previously stated, the CD timeframe is very condensed and occurs early in an officers’ 
career. Second and first lieutenants are the only ranks that receive semi-annual 
FITREPSs. Semi-annual reports allow the 540 days of observation to be computed twice 
per year, coinciding with the two CD boards. Semi-annual reports also prevent population 
overload on any single CD board. This allows the force to more accurately shape the 
distribution of officers.  
The FITREP evaluates a Marine on 13 attributes that are categorized into four 
sections: mission accomplishment, individual character, leadership, intellect and wisdom 
(MCO 1610.7, p. 4-21). It is designed to evaluate a Marines’ work performance, while 
also accounting for off duty actions. The reporting senior (RS) is defined as: “the first 
commissioned or warrant officer (or civilian GS-9/equivalent or above) in the reporting 
chain senior to the MRO” (USMC, 2015, p. 2-1). The FITREP is a performance anchored 
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rating scale (PARS) that assigns a numeric value to each selected trait. As stated in MCO 
1610.7, the numeric grading is as follows: 
Each block in the marking gradient for each attribute has an assigned 
numeric value as follows: A=1, B=2, C=3, D=4, E=5, F=6, G=7, and H=0 
(not observed). NOTE: Block H (not observed) has no value and does not 
factor into the calculation of the average. Each observed attribute numeric 
value is added to find the total, which is divided by the number of 
observed attributes to calculate the average, rounded to the nearest 
hundredth. (USMC, 2015, pp. 8-4–8-5) 
Each report receives an average of all rankings and is the first time a numeric 
value is assigned to a report. The Marine reported on (MRO) can view his/her master 
brief sheet (MBS) and view the average of their report and compare it to the average of 
the reports written by that RS in the same grade. The MRO can also see the highest score 
written by the RS and use it as a reference for their score. Once the RS has written three 
observed FITREPSs on Marines of the same grade, each report will be assigned a relative 
value (RV) between 80 and 100 percent.  
The relative value will appear on the MRO’s MBS in numeric fashion on 
an 80 to 100 scale. (1) A relative value between 93.34 and 100.00 
indicates the report is in the upper third of the RS profile. (2) A relative 
value between 86.67 and 93.33 indicates the report is in the middle third 
of the RS profile. (3) A relative value between 80.00 and 86.66 indicates 
the report is in the bottom third of the RS profile. (USMC, 2015, p. 8-6) 
The reviewing officer (RO) is the direct supervisor of the RS. The RO must 
“ensure the integrity of the system by giving close attention to accurate marking, 
narrative assessment, and timely reporting” (USMC, 2015, p. 2-2). The RO can concur or 
not with the RS’s assessment of the MRO. The RO also ranks the MRO according to 
their assessment. The RO’s ranking is converted numerically and the MRO can compare 
their score with other MROs of the same rank evaluated by the RO. This study does not 
use the RO’s average rankings to draw any conclusions; it focuses solely on the RS 
averages at the time of reporting. 
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B. MOTIVATION: TRADE-OFF BETWEEN QUANTITY AND QUALITY 
Buildups and drawdowns are necessary to maintain a professional military force. 
Throughout American history, buildups occur at the start of a conflict and occur rapidly 
at the conclusion of the conflict. Issues then arise with maintaining the quality of the 
force with these rapid changes in quantity. During the buildup the initial policy is to 
retain everyone quickly to reach the congressionally mandated end strength and quality is 
likely neglected in the process. Once the conflict ends, the force must return to its pre-
war size or what Congress determines should be the new end strength to stay prepared for 
future adversaries. 
The subsequent drawdown requires another policy and usually results in lower 
accession, early retirement opportunities, and stringent retention policies. Company grade 
officers become the easiest population with which to establish strict retention policies. 
The CD process becomes much more competitive, yet the field grade ranks are populated 
with officers retained during the noncompetitive buildup. This creates field grade ranks 
populated with officers of all types of quality, whereas the most competitive CD periods 
tends to select above-average officers due to strict retention policies. 
It thus becomes challenging for the USMC to systematically reduce the officer 
population during the drawdown while maintaining some desired level of quality. 
Incentives must be created to entice individuals to leave or the Corps has to force them 
out. Another problem is ensuring that low quality officers take the incentives to leave 
rather than high-quality officers. It is a very lengthy process to naturally purge the system 
without immediate incentives. Meanwhile, Title 10 regulates all officer promotions.  
C. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect or net change in the quality of 
the USMC officer population during the buildup and subsequent drawdown of forces. 
The natural hypothesis is that the average quality of USMC officers is lower when 
retaining nearly all officers during the buildup, and the implementation of competitive 
CD would increase average quality. This study forms empirical estimates of these trade-
offs in quantity and quality of the officer corps.  
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D. ASSUMPTIONS  
The primary assumption for this research is that the FITREP, as an output based 
measure of quality, is the best measure of officer quality available. Other individual 
input-based measures of quality are the physical fitness test (PFT), swim qualifications, 
rifle scores, the combat fitness test (CFT), and so forth. These input measures are used to 
predict career designation, but cannot solely be used to determine the overall quality of 
an officer. From a production function perspective, these input measures may also display 
diminishing returns or contributions to an officer’s quality, productivity, job 
performance, or output. The FITREP is designed for the RS to take into account the 
individual tests, physical and combat standards, as well as leadership qualities. Therefore, 
the FITREP is the best, most comprehensive measure of quality for an individual officer.  
To accept the FITREP as the best measure of quality, it must be assumed that the 
evaluations are not inflated and that they accurately measure an officer’s performance or 
quality. According to MCO 1610.7, “Countering inflation begins with the reporting 
officials, specifically the RS and RO, who must accurately report a Marine’s 
performance.” To reduce inflation tendencies, MCO 1610.7 states:  
1. The design of this report limits the ability of RSs to unjustifiably inflate a 
Marine’s performance. 
2. Reports must be based on a Marine’s performance vice sociability. 
Reporting officials can inadvertently render these controls ineffective by 
preparing and submitting FITREPSs that fail to adhere to both the letter 
and the spirit of this Manual. (USMC, 2015, p. 1–2) 
E. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question for this thesis asks: During the buildup and 
subsequent drawdown of forces between 2007 and 2013, what was the net change in the 
quality of USMC officers, as measured by the probability of CD selection and job 
performance measures? 
Secondary questions include: Are Cancian and Klein (2015) correct in their 
assessment that the quality of USMC officers declined? Cancian and Klein measure 
quality using performance on the General Classification Test (GCT) and examined the 
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years 1980 to 2014. Is the GCT an appropriate measure of officer quality and do 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This research is focuses on the net change in quality of USMC officers that 
occurred as a result of the buildup and drawdown of forces at the conclusion of a two-
front war. The studies reviewed in this chapter assess different variables that affect the 
quality of a force and also the mechanisms to reduce the force in an efficient fair manner.  
A. CANCIAN AND KLEIN 
Cancian and Klein’s research (2015) shows a decline in the quality of Marine 
Corps officers between 1980 and 2014. USMC officer performance on the General 
Classification Test (GCT) is the measure of quality used in the study. The GCT was 
developed during World War II and was intended to determine the learning abilities of 
incoming service members to better place them in the correct Marine Occupational 
Specialty (MOS). According to individuals’ results on the GCT, they would be classified 
into categories ranging from one to five, five being the category for members with less 
potential to learn (as compared to soldiers with average mental ability), and one being the 
category for recruits with the highest ability (Cancian & Klein, 2015, p. 5). This test 
allowed the services to better distribute the influx of forces during the buildup period.  
The test was designed to have an average grade of 100 with a standard deviation 
of 20 (Cancian & Klein, 2015, p. 5). The GCT was nearly phased out in 1973 in favor of 
the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB). The ASVAB was deemed 
the better test as Vietnam era conscription ended and the all-volunteer force began in 
1973 (Cancian & Klein, 2015, p. 1). Using the GCT, Cancian and Klein note, that “while 
85 percent of those taking the test in 1980 exceeded 120, the cut-off score for Marine 
officers in World War II, only 59 percent exceeded that score in 2014. At the upper end 
of the distribution, 4.9 percent of those taking the test scored above 150 in 1980 
compared to 0.7 percent in 2014” (Cancian & Klein, 2015, p. 3).  
Currently, the GCT is only administered by the Marine Corps to newly 
commissioned second lieutenants attending The Basic School (TBS). TBS is a six-month 
 14 
training evolution that is required for all Marine Corps officers and is guided by the 
following mission statement: 
Train and educate newly commissioned or appointed officers in the high 
standards of professional knowledge, esprit-de-corps, and leadership to 
prepare them for duty as company grade officers in the operating forces, 
with particular emphasis on the duties, responsibilities, and warfighting 
skills required of a rifle platoon commander. (United States Marine Corps, 
n.d.) 
During TBS an officer is evaluated on his or her intellectual, leadership, and physical 
fitness skills, with the highest priority given to leadership. The compilation of an officer’s 
grades determines the probability that an officer gets the MOS that he or she desires. The 
GCT has no effect on this process, nor is performance on the GCT used to determine 
grades or an officer’s subsequent career. In fact, anecdotal evidence and my own 
experience was that the GCT was not administered or, if the GCT was administered, 
officer candidates at TBS knew their GCT performance was of no particular 
consequence. As such, it is difficult to argue that GCT scores measure officer quality. 
On the other hand, performance on the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) is more 
commonly observed among officers, and the general population easily understands the 
scores. Cancian and Klein did obtain information from the Marine Corps Recruiting 
Command (MCRC) stating that from 2005–2014 SAT scores for new Marine officers 
averaged 1,200 points. In comparison, the average for high-school seniors that planned to 
attend college was 1,010 points (Cancian & Klein, 2015, pp. 9–10). The SAT is, 
arguably, the more relevant test, since it is easily understood and designed to adapt to 
generational gaps more than the antiquated GCT. They hypothesize that Marine officer 
quality declined, but they had only limited data to confirm the hypothesis. Furthermore, 
neither the GCT nor the SAT measures leadership qualities, which is arguably the most 
important attribute for a military officer. As such, evidence of a decline in the GCT 
and/or SAT performance of Marine officers may not necessarily reflect a reduction in 
quality.  
In addition, Cancian and Klein’s research analyzes data from 1980 to 2014, 
whereas this study focuses on the more recent officer cohorts between 2004 to 2015. This 
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research can only re-examine the overlapping years of 2004 to 2014 to verify Cancian 
and Klein’s results. It would also not be prudent for me to analyze FITREPs dating back 
to 1980 due to many changes in the performance evaluation system and the rating 
instrument. It is nevertheless important to analyze these overlapping years, because it 
represents the current officer population.  In contrast to Cancian and Klein’s work, 
however, this research uses the GCT and SAT scores to determine if the tests have a 
statistically significant impact on the probability of being career designated. As stated in 
the introduction, this research’s measure of quality relies not only on academic scores 
(input-based measure of quality), but also on FITREPs (output-based measure of quality). 
In their 2015 study, Cancian and Klein did not have access to FITREP information, since 
it is not available through a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request.  
B. GARZA  
Garza’s research (2014) identifies the significant predictors that could be used to 
determine the competitiveness of a company grade officer for the career designation (CD) 
board. It is very important to note that the competitive CD process did not start until 
FY10 and data observed came from FY10–FY13. This research is different in that the 
concern is not only on what it takes to earn CD, but also that CD is viewed as a one-time 
screening process to determine future quality at a single point in time. This research 
evaluates the average quality of the force as measured by changes in FITREPs and not by 
individual predictors of success for CD.  
C. THE DRAWDOWN OF THE MILITARY OFFICER CORPS  
The U.S. military end strength increased during the Cold War. Between 1989 and 
1996, post-Cold War, the force needed to drawdown its forces (CBO, 1999, preface). 
This is very similar to the current situation, as operations in Iraq have concluded and 
operations in Afghanistan are in the final stages of drawdown. To say that history is 
repetitive is an understatement. The post-Cold War Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
report states, “The managers faced a difficult challenge: to bring in enough new officers 
to maintain a combat-ready force in the future and yet keep faith with personnel already 
in uniform” (CBO, 1999, p. 3). These very same statements are echoed throughout the 
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Marine Corps during the current drawdown period. The 35th CMC, General James Amos, 
stated that, “while we are working hard to balance our myriad requirements, I want each 
of you to know that keeping faith with you and your families is a top priority of mine—I 
consider it a sacred responsibility” (deGrandpre, 2013). 
Reduction in forces (RIF) aims for as many service members as possible to 
voluntarily leave the service on self-imposed terms. This prevents difficult decisions that 
may separate a quality officer, mid-career, when attaining the 20 years to guarantee a 
pension were well within reach. Voluntary separations can be accomplished by many 
means. The methods used in the Obama administration mirror those used in the Clinton 
administration. The plans may have minute differences, but for the purpose of this study, 
they have the same effect. The tools at the services’ disposal are voluntary separation 
incentive (VSI), special separation benefit (SSB), and temporary early retirement 
(TERA). Another tool is selective early retirement (SER); however, if selected it forces 
an officer to retire regardless of the limitations outlined in the Defense Officer Personnel 
Management Act (DOPMA). 
This research does not focus on members leaving the service due to early 
separation; however, it is important on two fronts: 
1. The fact that the buildup kept almost all officers means that there was 
likely an impact on the average quality of the force. 
2. A follow-on study should be conducted to determine if these programs 
targeted the correct population that would retain the highest quality 
officers, while separating the lower quality. Policy revision should be 
warranted if the wrong population was targeted for reduction.  
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III. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the various entities that provided data, the numerous 
variables used, and the methodology for data analysis. All data spans the timeframe of 
FY04–FY15. 
A. DATA SOURCES 
This research provides a framework to analyze the net change in quality of 
Marine Corps officers that occurred as a result of the buildup to an end strength of 
202,000 and the subsequent reduction in forces to 184,000 (Sisk, 2015). Personnel 
performance data and FITREPSs are needed to accurately determine and analyze any 
changes in quality. The following section lists and describes the data sources used for the 
subsequent analyses. 
1. Total Forces Data Warehouse (TFDW) 
All officers’ characteristics, demographics, and training information for this 
research is provided by Total Forces Data Warehouse (TFDW), which is defined as  
a system of the Manpower Information Technology Branch of Manpower 
& Reserve Affairs (M&RA). It is the Marine Corps’ official system of 
record for USC Title 10 end strength reporting. The TFDW houses more 
than 30 years of historical manpower data from a variety of USMC and 
DOD systems including MCTFS, MASS, RCCPDS, MCTIMS and 
DEERS, in one central location to provide manpower analysts with a 
comprehensive view of a Marine’s career from “street to fleet.” (TFDW, 
n.d.) 
Data from TFDW consist of eight, non-symmetrical, personnel databases that 
were stripped of personally identifiable information (PII) prior to transmission. TFDW 
provided a randomly-generated unique identifier for each personnel, so it could later be 
merged with the FITREP database. However, the personnel files from TFDW contained 
many observations with the same identifier, as an officer’s record was updated within the 
same year. To ensure the data contain only one record per officer-FY, and that this data 
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reflect characteristics of a Marine officer (e.g., marital status) at the end of a fiscal year, 
each of the eight files had to be cleaned before being merged.  
2. Manpower Management Records and Performance-30 (MMRP-30) 
MMRP-30 is the performance evaluation section of the Manpower Management 
Division within Manpower and Reserve Affairs (M&RA). MMRP-30’s mission is “to 
support the Marines’ needs in ensuring their performance evaluation records are up to 
date and prepared for promotion boards” (MMRP-30, n.d.). MMRP-30 maintains all 
FITREP data for the Marine Corps. Similar to TFDW data, all PII information was 
stripped, and officers are identified only through a randomly-generated identifier. The 
data from MMRP-30 came in seven different files; however, the data originated from the 
same database, it was stored in the same manner, and the data was easily appended.  
3. Sample Restriction and Number of Observations 
Once cleaned, limited to the correct officer population, and merged using the 
unique identifier, the data represent 172,771 officer-FY observations for analysis. The 
observations span FY04–FY15 and are restricted to USMC officers at the ranks of first 
lieutenant to lieutenant colonel. A full list of descriptive statistics are available in 
Appendix E. 
B. VARIABLES  
1. Dependent Variables 
a. Career Designation (CD) 
CD is a force-shaping tool that intends to retain the Corps’ desired level of quality 
officers. The requirements for CD eligibility can be found in MCO 1001.45J and in the 
introduction of this thesis. CD is a binary variable that takes on a value of one if an 
officer is offered and selects CD or is offered CD and declines the offer. Declining 
implies the officer possessed the qualities desired by the Corps, but the individual 
voluntarily executed their end of active service (EAS) obligation. All other values of CD 
are coded as zero. 
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It is also useful to note that given the sample restriction, the research focuses on 
the point in time when non-CD, changes to CD in an officer’s career, or when the 
officer’s status never changes and he or she subsequently exits the USMC active 
component. Selection to Captain is not viewed as a measure of quality since Title 10, 
U.S. Code requires all eligible officers to be promoted to the rank of captain.  
b. FY Average of FITREPSs 
As previously explained, a FITREP attains an average rating based on the marks 
given by the RS. A Marine officer is never stagnant in any one position. Company grade 
officers frequently change jobs to gain experience and demonstrate versatility. Usually, 
every positional change coincides with an occasion that mandates a new FITREP. 
Reporting occasions can be found in MCO 1610.7, the Performance Evaluation System 
(PES). It is not uncommon for an MRO to receive multiple occasional reports throughout 
any given FY.  
This research’s goal is to analyze net quality changes based on FY. If an officer 
has multiple reports during a FY, the data first has to be manipulated to create an FY 
average. To do so, the data is transformed wide by FY and identification (ID) number and 
subsequently the report averages for that FY were averaged. This created the variable 
“avg_this_rpt”; which is the average of the report averages for a FY. The data is then 
retransformed to long data, thus creating only one average for each FY. This maintains 
the integrity of the data and prevents dropping any observations for a given officer. Once 
transformed, this allows “avg_this_rpt” to be a dependent variable for analyses.  
c. FY Average of FITREPSs minus FY Average of Average RS High 
Additionally, it is interesting to analyze any change in the dispersion of each 
report average relative to the report highs of a given RS. Once again there may be 
multiple reports for an MRO in a given FY. The data was transformed wide and a 
variable was created for FY average of the average RS high ratings. The data was then 
transformed long so that there is only one average for each officer during the FY.  
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A new variable called “avg_hi” is created to reflect the FY FITREP average 
minus the average of the RS high reports. Thus, “avg_hi” measures the deviation of an 
officer’s ratings from the RS’ historically highest rating. The more negative this variable 
is, the lower the officer’s quality relative to his or her peers in the given period. Vice 
versa, the closer to zero or even positive this variable becomes, the higher the quality on 
average during this period. 
2. Independent Variables 
Only those independent variables that are not easily understood are discussed in 
this section. Ethnicity/race is not included as a control variable in this study for two 
reasons:  
1. The study is not concerned with analyzing quality across ethnicities/race, 
although it is recommended as follow-on research.  
2. The databases from TFDW containing ethnicity/race appeared unreliable 
and difficult to reconcile across personnel files, and a lot of assumptions 
would have to be made to identify an officer’s ethnicity/race. Therefore, 
the researcher determined adding race to the model would only introduce 
statistical noise. 
This research is not concerned with the probability of CD based upon individual 
military occupation specialties (MOSs). However, the research design, described in more 
detail in this section, necessitates grouping the MOSs and analyzing several years of data 
by MOS groups. In general, lawyers and pilots are accepted for CD at rates over 95 
percent; therefore, I use these two specialties as the control group in an experimental 
research design. The remaining MOSs are divided into combat and non-combat groups. 
All MOS groups are coded as binary variables that take the value of zero if an officer’s 
MOS does not belong to that group and one if it does. The three MOS classification 
groups are thus the control group, for whom end strength policy changes have little to no 
impact, and the two “treated” groups: combat, and non-combat. 
3. Performance Independent Variables 
The data contains numerous variables for individual performance tests that were 
military requirements or that may have been taken outside of the service and entered in 
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one’s record. The American College Testing (ACT) and Scholastic Assessment Test 
(SAT) are standardized tests usually taken by high school students in preparation for 
college applications. Both tests are used to for college acceptance and admittance 
requirements. 
The USMC requires an SAT of at least 1,000 to be commissioned an officer. 
Recently, the SAT was revised changing the maximum score to 2,400 from 1,600. It was 
assumed that all officers in this data took the older SAT with a maximum score of 1,600. 
The data contained 11 scores greater than 1600, and those scores were truncated to 1,600. 
There were 691 scores below 1,000, and those scores were edited to the required 1,000. 
However, there are 154,155 scores that are zero or missing in the data. A missing SAT 
variable (xsat) was created to indicate this missing category and prevent deleting 154,155 
observations from the analysis. The effect of missing SAT on officer quality can now 
also be analyzed.  
The Law School Admission Test (LSAT) is included in the data and 88 percent of 
those scores fall within the MOS control group containing lawyers. This is obvious since 
the control group population represents lawyers and pilots. This research used rifle range 
score classes to analyze the effect on specific dependent variables. The rifle range classes 
were coded as zero for all classes that were not expert and one for expert class.  
Regional, Cultural, and Language Familiarization (RCLF) is a fairly new 
initiative by the USMC. Each new officer at TBS is assigned a different region to become 
familiar with throughout their career. The familiarization process requires multiple, 
usually online courses, to be completed at each rank. The mission of RCLF is: “to ensure 
that Marine units are globally prepared and regionally focused so they are effective at 
navigating and influencing the culturally complex 21st Century operating environment in 
support of the Marine Corps’ missions and requirements” (Marine Corps University, 
,n.d.). RCLF was not used in this research due to only a small portion of the drawdown 
population being subjected to RCLF. An even smaller number of officers have completed 
RCLF due to lack of time in the system with the new requirement. 
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Swim qualifications underwent a revision during the time period of the data. 
Marine Corps Water Survival Training Program (MCWSTP), MCO 1500.52D, mandates 
the USMC swim qualification requirements (USMC, 2010b). For the purposes of this 
research swim qualification was coded as a binary variable. Officers with a qualification 
of “Q,” “1,” “2,” “Advanced,” “Marine Corps Instructor of Water Survival (MCIWS),” 
and “Marine Corps Instructor Trainer of Water Survival (MCITWS)” were coded with a 
one and all others were coded with 0. 
The physical fitness test (PFT), as prescribed in MCO 6100.13 differentiates 
classes of PFT scores into three main categories. The categories are first, second, and 
third classes, with first class corresponding to a higher score and better physical fitness. 
The numeric scores can range from 0–300, with 300 being a perfect score. To reduce 
mitigating effects this research placed PFT classes into two categories. The variable 
“pft_class” is a binary variable that is assigned the value of one if a first class PFT is 
achieved and zero otherwise. A binary variable called “weight_control” was created to 
identify an officer that has ever been assigned to weight control. The variable is assigned 
the value of one if the officer has ever assigned and zero otherwise. 
C. METHODOLOGY 
The research design used in this research is a difference-in-differences (DiD) 
analysis, a method of program evaluation typically used by applied economists. In the 
absence of a social experiment where a policy intervention, or in the language of 
econometrics, the treatment, is randomly allocated across the population, the DiD design 
mimics an experimental research design using observational data. 
 One way to estimate the impact of end strength policy changes is to simply 
examine outcomes before and after the policy change. This is referred to as a simple 
Difference estimator in econometrics. Within the subject population (USMC officers), 
what was the average change in quality between 2004 and 2015? This would require 
estimating models of the form: 
 0 1it itY Tβ β ε= + +   (1) 
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where Y measures the outcome or quality measure, and T=1 if the Officer i is observed 
after the policy change (Gertler et al., 2011, pp. 95–98). However, one problem with the 
simple Difference estimator is that we cannot distinguish if this change over time in the 
outcome Y is due to the policy change or from secular changes (for instance, if USMC 
officer quality is on an upward trend due to better recruiting practices or worsening U.S. 
economy).  
To improve on the simple Difference estimator and to estimate a causal effect of 
end strength policy changes, I compare the average change in outcomes over time 
between a group affected by the change (the treatment group) to a group I argue to be 
unaffected by the change (the control group). I designate the combat and non-combat 
groups to be treatment groups, and lawyers and pilots to the control group. 
“The idea is to correct the simple Difference before and after for the treatment 
group by subtracting the simple Difference for the control group” (Duflo, n.d., p. 14). In 
the next section, I present the DiD regression models I estimate. In implementing the DiD 
method, the research eliminates or at the least mitigates biases such as mean reversion 
bias (the tendency for data to revert to the mean over time) and selection bias (as long as 
the selection is common to both treatment and control groups) (Gertler et al., 2011, pp. 
95–98). 
The crucial assumption for the DiD estimator to be an unbiased causal estimate of 
the impact of end strength changes on USMC officer quality is that, without a policy 
change, the average change over time in quality would have been the same for treatment 
and control groups (Duflo, n.d., p.13). In the language of econometrics, this is called the 
parallel trends assumption. The research examines the validity of this assumption in the 
robustness checks section of Chapter IV. 
D. EMPIRICAL MODELS 
1. Model 1: Probit CD during the Buildup FY07–FY09 
Model 1, as shown in equation 2, is a probit regression model that analyzes the 
probability of being selected for CD during the buildup period, FY07–FY09.  
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( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4 5Pr 1 Φ *it t i t i it itcd buildup M buildup M perf demβ β β β β β= = + + + + +  (2) 
where buildup=1 if Officer i is observed during FY07-FY09 and zero otherwise; M is a 
vector of two indicator variables representing combat MOS and another for non-combat 
MOS. Thus, β3 represents the DiD estimate of the net change in CD selection rates 
during the build-up period. It is the before-after change in CD between the treated groups 
(combat and non-combat) relative to the control group.  
The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
buildup interacted with the fiscal year (FY) average of the averages of each report written 
on a given MRO in a FY (buildup*avg_this_rpt), buildup interacted with the average 
report average minus the average RS report high for a given rank (buildup*avg_hi), ACT 
Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), LSAT Score (lsat), Missing 
LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT interacted with Missing SAT 
(sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, zero otherwise), AFQT Score 
(afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer was ever assigned to weight 
control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero otherwise, swim qual class 
(swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), and missing swim class (xswim). The 
demographic (dem) variable consists of: Marital Status (marital_status), Number of 
Dependents (num_dep), and Sex (sex, male=1, zero otherwise). 
2. Model 2: Probit CD during the Drawdown FY10–FY13 
Model 2 is a probit model that estimates the probability that an officer would be 
accepted for CD the drawdown period. The model is shown in equation 3: 
  (3) 
where drawdown=1 if Officer i is observed during FY10-FY13 and zero otherwise; M is 
a vector of two indicator variables representing combat MOS and another for non-combat 
MOS. Thus, β3 represents the DiD estimate of the net change in CD selection rates 
during the drawdown period. It is the before-after change in CD between the treated 
groups (combat and non-combat) relative to the control group.  
( ) ( )0 1 2 3 4 5Pr 1 Φ *it t i t i it itdrawdown dracd M M perf dewd mownβ β β β β β= = + + + + +
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The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
drawdown interacted with the fiscal year (FY) average of the averages of each report 
written on a given MRO in a FY (drawdown*avg_this_rpt), drawdown interacted with 
the average report average minus the average RS report high for a given rank 
(drawdown*avg_hi), ACT Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), 
LSAT Score (lsat), Missing LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT 
interacted with Missing SAT (sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, 
zero otherwise), AFQT Score (afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer 
was ever assigned to weight control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero 
otherwise, swim qual class (swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), and missing swim 
class (xswim). The demographic (dem) variable consists of: Marital Status 
(marital_status), Number of Dependents (num_dep), and Sex (sex, male=1, zero 
otherwise). 
3. Model 3: FY Average FITREPs during the Buildup FY07–FY09
Model 3 is a linear regression model estimating the effects of the buildup on the 
FY average of the FITREP averages for a given MRO. Equation 4 represents the model. 
1 2 3 4 50_ _ *it t i t i it it itavg this rpt buildup M buildup M perf demβ β β β β β= + + + +∈+ +   (4) 
where buildup=1 if Officer i is observed during FY07-FY09 and zero otherwise; M is a 
vector of two indicator variables representing combat MOS and another for non-combat 
MOS. Thus, β3 represents the DiD estimate of the net change in job performance of 
USMC officers during the build-up period, as measured by FITREP averages. It is the 
before-after change in average job performance between the treated groups (combat and 
non-combat) relative to the control group.  
The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
ACT Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), LSAT Score (lsat), 
Missing LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT interacted with Missing 
SAT (sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, zero otherwise), AFQT 
Score (afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer was ever assigned to 
weight control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero otherwise, swim 
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qual class (swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), binary variable for CD (cd=1 if 
accepted, zero otherwise), and missing swim class (xswim). The demographic (dem) 
variable consists of: Marital Status (marital_status), Number of Dependents (num_dep), 
and Sex (sex, male=1, zero otherwise). 
4. Model 4: FY Average FITREPs during the Drawdown FY10–FY13 
Model 4 is a linear regression model estimating the effects of the drawdown on 
the FY average of the FITREP averages for a given MRO. Equation 5 represents the 
model. 
1 2 3 4 50_ _ *it t i t i it it itdrawdown draavg this rpt M M perf demwdownβ β β β β β= + + + +∈+ +  (5) 
where drawdown=1 if Officer i is observed during FY10-FY13 and zero otherwise; M is 
a vector of two indicator variables representing combat MOS and another for non-combat 
MOS. Thus, β3 represents the DiD estimate of the net change in job performance of 
USMC officers during the drawdown period, as measured by. It is the before-after change 
in average job performance between the treated groups (combat and non-combat) relative 
to the control group.  
The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
ACT Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), LSAT Score (lsat), 
Missing LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT interacted with Missing 
SAT (sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, zero otherwise), AFQT 
Score (afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer was ever assigned to 
weight control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero otherwise, swim 
qual class (swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), binary variable for CD (cd=1 if 
accepted, zero otherwise), and missing swim class (xswim). The demographic (dem) 
variable consists of: Marital Status (marital_status), Number of Dependents (num_dep), 
and Sex (sex, male=1, zero otherwise). 
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5. Model 5: FY Average FITREPSs minus FY Average RS High during 
the Buildup FY07–FY09 
Model 5 is a linear regression model estimating the effects of the buildup on the 
FY average of the FITREP averages minus the FY average RS high for a given MRO. 
Equation 6 represents the model. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5_ *it t i t i it it itavg hi buildup M buildup M perf demβ β β β β β= + + + +∈+ +  (6) 
where buildup=1 if Officer i is observed during FY07-FY09 and zero otherwise; M is a 
vector of two indicator variables representing combat MOS and another for non-combat 
MOS. Thus, β3 represents the DiD estimate of the net change in job performance of 
USMC officers during the buildup period, as measured by the officer’s FITREP average 
relative to his or her reporting senior’s highest score. It is thus the before-after change in 
job performance between the treated groups (combat and non-combat) relative to the 
control group, on average and holding everything else constant.  
The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
ACT Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), LSAT Score (lsat), 
Missing LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT interacted with Missing 
SAT (sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, zero otherwise), AFQT 
Score (afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer was ever assigned to 
weight control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero otherwise, swim 
qual class (swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), binary variable for CD (cd=1 if 
accepted, zero otherwise), and missing swim class (xswim). The demographic (dem) 
variable consists of: Marital Status (marital_status), Number of Dependents (num_dep), 
and Sex (sex, male=1, zero otherwise). 
6. Model 6: FY Average FITREPSs minus FY RS High Averages during 
the Drawdown FY10–FY13 
Model 6 is a linear regression model estimating the effects of the drawdown on 
the FY average of the FITREP averages minus the FY RS high averages for a given 
MRO. Equation 7 represents the model. 
 0 1 2 3 4 5_ *it t i tt it it iidrawdown dravg hi M M perf demawdownβ β β β β β= + + + +∈+ +  (7) 
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where drawdown=1 if Officer i is observed during FY10-13 and zero otherwise; M is a 
vector of two indicator variables representing combat MOS and another for non-combat 
MOS. Thus, β3 represents the DiD estimate of the net change in promotion rates during 
the build-up period. It is the before-after change in CD between the treated groups 
(combat and non-combat) relative to the control group.  
The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
ACT Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), LSAT Score (lsat), 
Missing LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT interacted with Missing 
SAT (sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, zero otherwise), AFQT 
Score (afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer was ever assigned to 
weight control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero otherwise, swim 
qual class (swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), binary variable for CD (cd=1 if 
accepted, zero otherwise), and missing swim class (xswim). The demographic (dem) 
variable consists of: Marital Status (marital_status), Number of Dependents (num_dep), 
and Sex (sex, male=1, zero otherwise). 
7. Model 7: Cancian and Klein Study Validation 
Model 7 is a linear regression estimating the effects of the FY average of 
FITREPSs on GCT scores. The intent of this model is to re-examine Cancian and Klein’s 
2015 study determining USMC officer quality has declined due to a reduction in GCT 
exam scores over time. Cancian and Klein’s study analyzes data from 1980 to 2014, 
while this research analyzes data from 2004 to 2015 only. Thus, the exercise here is not a 
full replication, but a re-examination of Cancian and Klein’s findings with a focus on the 
quality of more recent and current officer populations. Model 7 can be seen in equation 8.
 
1 2 3 4 50 _ _ _ _ *it t it it it i itt tFY avg this rpt avggct FY perf demthis rptβ β β β β β= + + + + +∈+  (8) 
where FY is a vector of indicator variables of all FYs represented in the dataset, FY04-
FY15. β2 corresponds to the association of GCT scores with the FY average of an MRO’s 
FITREPSs. Thus, β3 represents the year-to-year change in FITREP averages associated 
with year-to-year changes in GCT scores.  
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The performance (perf) variable is a vector of independent variables including: 
ACT Score (act), Missing ACT Score (xact), GCT Score (gct), LSAT Score (lsat), 
Missing LSAT(xlsat), SAT Score (sat), Missing SAT (_sat), SAT interacted with Missing 
SAT (sat_sat), Class of Rifle Score (rifle_class=1 if first class, zero otherwise), AFQT 
Score (afqt), weight control status (weight_control=1 if an officer was ever assigned to 
weight control), PFT class (pft_class=1 if pft class is first class, zero otherwise, swim 
qual class (swim qual=1 if advanced, zero otherwise), binary variable for CD (cd=1 if 
accepted, zero otherwise), MOS category for combat (combat=1 if combat MOS, zero 
otherwise), MOS category for non-combat (non-combat=1 if non-combat MOS, zero 
otherwise), and missing swim class (xswim). The demographic (dem) variable consists 
of: Marital Status (marital_status), Number of Dependents (num_dep), and Sex (sex, 
male=1, zero otherwise). 
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IV. RESULTS 
A. MODELS 1 AND 2: PROBIT CD DURING THE BUILDUP (FY07–FY09) 
AND DRAWDOWN (FY10–FY13) 
1. Net Change in FY Average of FITREP Averages between the Buildup 
and Drawdown 
The primary purpose of this thesis is to determine if there is a net change in the 
quality of USMC officers as a result of the transitional period of the buildup relative to 
the drawdown. One key variable is to view the change in the FY average of FITREPSs 
(avg_this_rpt) for a given officer relative to the probability of being selected for CD.  
Table 1 displays the results of the effect of FY average of FITREPSs on CD 
selection for both periods. The full results, with all variables, are reported in Appendix A. 
Note that all other factors in Appendix A (e.g., test scores and demographics) are being 
held constant even as we compare across the treatment and control groups, in an effort to 
make an apples-to-apples comparison across the time periods. Estimates of Model 1 show 
that on average, 1 more point on the FY average FITREPSs during the buildup increases 
the probability of CD selection by 4.87 percentage points, for the treatment group relative 
to the control group in the same period. During the drawdown, Model 2 shows that on 
average, 1 more point on the FY average FITREPSs increases the probability of CD 
selection by 5.89 percentage points, again for the treatment relative to the control group 
in the same period. Both results are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence 
level. 
A general conclusion about the change in quality between both periods can be 
drawn by taking the difference between both models (triple difference). Table 1 shows 
that the effect of “avg_this_rpt” on CD selection during the drawdown minus the effect of 
“avg_this_rpt” during the buildup yields a 1.02 percentage point increase in the 
probability of being offered CD. In other words, the USMC has a higher reliance on 
FITREPs as a predictor of future success during the drawdown, relevant to the buildup.  
Since different models are not guaranteed to yield the same results due to the 
observations not being identical, it is imperative to conduct a joint test between the two 
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models to determine if 1.02 percentage points are significantly different than zero. 
Simultaneously estimating Models 1 and 2 allows for this joint test. The test rejects the 
null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of FITREP 
average scores on CD selection across the buildup versus drawdown ( p-value of 0.0000); 
thus, the triple difference of 1.02 percentage points between the models is relevant and 
significantly different than 0. 










FY FITREP Average During Buildup (FY07-
10) avg_this_rpt build 0.0487 
FY FITREP Average During Drawdown 
(FY10-13) avg_this_rpt draw 0.0589 
Triple Difference 0.0102 
The joint test verifies that the USMC has a greater focus on the FITREP during 
the drawdown for selecting officers to CD. This finding is consistent with the 
interpretation that with the greater demand for quantity (nearly 100 percent of officers 
were retained) during the buildup, the trade-off was a lower quality of officers. 
Meanwhile, during the drawdown period when only 55 percent were being retained, 
above average officers must have been selected to remain in service. To empirically 
establish whether the quality of the officer population did indeed change with end 
strength changes, the later set of Models examine differences in FITREPs as the 
dependent variable.  
2. Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs minus FY Average of RS
Highs between the Buildup and Drawdown
An alternative measure of officer quality based on their job performance is the 
difference between the FY average of FITREPSs minus the FY average of reporting 
senior (RS) highs. The RS high is the highest FITREP written by an RS on any MRO of 
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the same rank. If the RS writes a report higher than the current high, the new highest 
FITREP is recorded for future reference. Thus, this measure of officer quality reflects a 
Marine officer’s job performance relative to the best similarly-ranked officer the 
evaluator ever rated. Using this alternative measure of officer quality, I also test the 
hypothesis that the quality of USMC officers as a result of the transitional period of the 
buildup relative to the drawdown is significantly different from 0. The DiD for each 
model can be seen in the interaction variables with “avg_hi” and either the buildup or 
drawdown dummy variable.  
Table 2 displays the results of the effect of the FY average FITREPs minus the 
FY average of RS highs on CD selection for both periods. The full results, with all 
variables, are reported in Appendix A. Note that similar to the previous results, all other 
factors in Appendix A (e.g., test scores and demographics) are being held constant even 
as we compare across the treatment and control groups, in an effort to make an apples-to-
apples comparison across the time periods. Estimates of Model 1 show that on average, 1 
more point on the FY average FITREP minus the FY average RS Highs during the 
buildup increases the probability of CD selection by 5.67 percentage points, for the 
treatment group relative to the control group in the same period. During the drawdown, 
Model 2 shows that on average, 1 more point on the FY average FITREPS minus the FY 
average of RS Highs increases the probability of CD selection by 9.12 percentage points, 
again for the treatment group relative to the control group in the same period. Both results 
are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
Table 2.   Models 1 and 2 FY Average FITREPSs minus FY Average RS 
Highs Triple Difference 












FY FITREP Average minus FY Average 
RS High During Buildup (FY07-10) avg_hi_build 0.0567 
 
  
FY FITREP Average minus FY Average 
RS High During Drawdown (FY10-13) avg_hi_draw 
 
0.0912   




As with the previous estimates, a general conclusion about the change in quality 
between both periods can be drawn by taking the difference between both models (triple 
difference). Table 2 shows that the effect of “avg_hi” on CD selection during the 
drawdown minus the effect of “avg_hi” during the buildup yields a 3.45 percentage point 
increase in the probability of being offered CD. In other words, the USMCs reliance on 
FITREPs as a future predictor of success is significantly higher in the drawdown relative 
to the buildup. In this sense, CD was more selective based on FITREPs during the 
drawdown vs. the buildup. 
Again, different models are not guaranteed to yield the same results due to the 
observations not being identical. It is imperative to conduct a joint test between the two 
models to determine if 3.45 percentage points are significantly different than zero. 
Simultaneously estimating Models 1 and 2 allows for this joint test. The test rejects the 
null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the effect of FITREP 
average scores minus average RS highs on CD selection across the buildup vs. drawdown 
(p-value of 0.0000); thus, the triple difference of 3.45 percentage points between the 
models are relevant and significantly different than 0. Note also that this triple difference 
estimator is three times larger in magnitude than the previous estimate. 
3. Probability of CD for Combat MOS Group between the Buildup and 
Drawdown  
Given the above results, it is useful to look at the change in probability of being 
offered CD amongst MOS groups. This can be conducted by taking a DiD in the model 
by including interaction variables for the MOS and period. As shown in Table 3, the 
combat MOS group during the buildup period were 5.54 percentage points more likely to 
be offered CD relative to the control group. Whereas, during the drawdown period the 
combat MOS group is 2.76 percentage points more likely to be accepted for CD than the 
control group. Both results are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
The triple difference for the combat MOS can then be formed by subtracting the 
results of Model 1 from Model 2. Table 3 shows the reduction in the probability of being 
offered CD in the drawdown is 2.78 percentage points relative to the buildup. Yet again, 
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a joint test must be conducted to determine the significance of this triple difference. The 
joint test yields a p-value of 0.0001, which rejects the null that the probability of being 
offered CD during both periods is the same. This is consistent with the earlier figures that 
nearly 100 percent of officers were retained during the buildup while selection of the 
combat MOS fell to 55 percent during the drawdown. The full results of the model can be 
seen in Appendix A.  
Table 3.   Probability of CD for Combat MOS Group between the Buildup 










 Label Variable 
   Combat Interacted with Buildup 
(FY07-09) comb_build 0.0554 










4. Probability of CD for Non-Combat MOS Group between the Buildup 
and Drawdown 
The results should also be analyzed for the non-combat MOS group. Once again, 
the difference-in-differences is estimated by including interaction variables for the MOS 
and period. As shown in Table 4, the non-combat MOS group during the buildup period 
is 1.93 percentage points more likely to be offered CD relative to the control group in the 
same period. Whereas, during the drawdown period the non-combat MOS group is 5.95 
percentage points less likely to be accepted for CD than the control group. Both results 
are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level. 
The triple difference for the non-combat MOS is estimated by subtracting the 
results of Model 1 from Model 2. The probability of being offered CD in the drawdown 
is lower by 7.88 percentage points for the non-combat group relative to the control group. 
Yet again, a joint test must be conducted to determine the significance of the triple 
difference. The joint test yields a p-value of 0.0000, which rejects the null hypothesis that 
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the probability of being offered CD during both periods is the same. Similar to the earlier 
figures for combat MOS, this is consistent with the fact that nearly 100 percent of officers 
were retained during the buildup and the non-combat MOS fell to 55 percent during the 
drawdown.  
Table 4.   Probability of CD for Non-Combat MOS Group between the 
Buildup and Drawdown 













Non-Combat Interacted with Buildup 
(FY07-09) non-comb_build 0.0193 
 
  
Non-Combat Interacted with Drawdown 
(FY10-13) non-comb_draw 
 
-0.0595   
  Triple Difference 
 
  -0.0788 
 
B. MODELS 3 AND 4: FY AVERAGE FITREPSS DURING THE BUILDUP 
(FY07-FY09) VERSUS THE DRAWDOWN (FY10–FY13) 
The above results establish that the USMC put a statistically greater emphasis on 
the FITREP during the drawdown for selecting officers to CD. This finding is consistent 
with the interpretation that with the greater demand for quantity during the buildup, the 
trade-off was a lower quality of officers. To empirically determine the change in officer 
quality, Models 3 and 4 estimate the net change in the FY average FITREPSs between 
the buildup and drawdown periods by MOS groups. 
1. Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs 
between the Periods 
Table 5 displays the results of the change in FY average FITREPS experienced by 
the combat MOS group during the buildup and drawdown periods. The full results, with 
all variables, are reported in Appendix B. Note that all other factors in Appendix B (e.g., 
test scores and demographics) are being held constant even as we compare across the 
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treatment and control groups, in an effort to make an apples-to-apples comparison across 
the time periods.  
Model 3 estimates the combat MOS group received FITREPS that, on average, 
were 0.4592 points higher than the control group in the same period. Recall that the 
average FITREP scores are on a 1 to 7 point scale, and 0.4592 is about a quarter of a 
standard deviation. During the drawdown, the combat group, on average receives 
FITREPS that are 0.4913 points higher, relative to the control group in the same period. 
Again, 0.4913 points is about a quarter of a standard deviation. Both results are 
statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  
As before, by taking the difference between both models (triple difference), I can 
form estimates of the change in quality between both periods. Table 5 shows the effect of 
having a combat MOS on the FY average FITREP during the drawdown minus the effect 
of having a combat MOS on the FY average FITREP during the buildup yields a 0.0321 
point increase in the average FITREP score. In other words, the quality of USMC officers 
as measured by the positive change in average FITREP scores is higher in the drawdown 
relative to the buildup.  
Again, different models are not guaranteed to yield the same results due to the 
observations not being identical. Simultaneously estimating Models 3 and 4 allows for a 
joint test between the two models to determine if 0.0321 points are significantly different 
than zero. The test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the quality of officers with a combat MOS across the buildup vs. drawdown 
(p-value of 0.0223); thus the triple difference of 0.0321 points between the models are 
relevant and significantly different than 0. This is consistent with the primary hypothesis 
that quality changed between the periods and the drawdown period possesses higher 
quality combat MOS officers, on average. 
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Table 5.   Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs 
between the Periods 










FY07-13   
Label 
   
  











0.4913   
  
Triple 
Difference      0.0321 
 
2. Non-Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs 
between the Periods 
Table 6 displays the results of the change in FY average FITREPS experienced by 
the non-combat MOS group during the buildup and drawdown periods. The full results, 
with all variables, are reported in Appendix B. Note that all other factors in Appendix B 
(e.g., test scores and demographics) are being held constant even as we compare across 
the treatment and control groups, as with the previous models.  
Model 3 estimates the non-combat MOS group during the buildup received 
FITREPS that, on average were 0.381 points higher, relative to the control group in the 
same period. Recall that the average FITREP scores are on a 1 to 7 point scale, and 0.381 
is also about a quarter of a standard deviation. During the drawdown, the non-combat 
group, on average receives FITREPS that are 0.4644 points higher, relative to the control 
group in the same period. Again, 0.4644 points is about a quarter of a standard deviation. 
Both results are statistically significant at the 99 percent confidence level.  
To estimate the change in quality between both periods, I again take the 
difference between both models (triple difference). Table 6 shows that the effect of 
having a non-combat MOS on the FY average FITREP during the drawdown minus the 
effect of having a non-combat MOS on the FY average FITREP during the buildup yields 
a 0.0834 point increase in the average FITREP score. In other words, the quality of 
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USMC officers as measured by the positive change in average FITREP scores is higher in 
the drawdown relative to the buildup for the non-combat MOS group.  
As before, I conduct a joint test to see if 0.0834 points are significantly different 
from zero. The test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the quality of officers with a non-combat MOS across the buildup vs. 
drawdown (p-value of 0.0000); thus the triple difference of 0.0834 points between the 
Models 3 and 4 are relevant and significantly different than 0. This is consistent with the 
primary hypothesis that quality changed between the periods and the drawdown period is 
characterized by higher quality non-combat MOS officers, on average. 
Table 6.   Non-Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of 
FITREPSs between the Periods 





Model 4: Average 
This Report 
Drawdown FY07-
13   
Label 
   
  
Non-Combat Interacted with 
Buildup (FY07-09) non-comb build 0.381 
 
  
Non-Combat Interacted with 
Drawdown (FY10-13) non-comb draw 
 
0.4644   
  Triple Difference   0.0834 
 
C. MODELS 5 AND 6: REGRESSION OF FY AVERAGE FITREPSS MINUS 
FY AVERAGE REPORT HIGHS DURING THE BUILDUP (FY07–FY09) 
VERSUS THE DRAWDOWN (FY10–FY13) 
Models 5 and 6 analyze the net change in the FY average of FITREPSs minus the 
FY average of the RS high, “avg_hi,” relative to each MOS group over the duration of 
the buildup and drawdown periods. The “avg_hi” should be a negative number unless, in 
the unlikely event, that all FITREPSs in the population were written above the RS high. 
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1. Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs minus 
the FY Average of RS High between the Two Periods 
Table 7 displays the results of the change in FY average FITREPS minus FY 
average RS highs (avg_hi) experienced by the combat MOS group during the buildup and 
drawdown periods. The full results, with all variables, are reported in Appendix C. Note 
that all other factors in Appendix C (e.g., test scores and demographics) are also being 
held constant even as we compare across the treatment and control groups. Model 5 
estimates results of “avg_hi” for the combat MOS group were 0.0491 points lower, 
relative to the control group in the same period. During the drawdown, the combat group, 
on average experiences a 0.0403 reduction in “avg_hi,” relative to the control group in 
the same period. 
To draw a general conclusion about the change in quality between both periods, I 
take the difference between both models (triple difference). Table 7 shows 0.0088 
“avg_hi” point increase in the difference of having a combat MOS during the drawdown 
vs. buildup. In other words, the quality of USMC officers as measured by the positive 
change in “avg_hi” is higher in the drawdown relative to the buildup. Interpreting the 
results, a positive number implies the “avg_hi” becomes closer to zero. For the difference 
in the models to become less negative, job performance ratings are such that they are 
closer to or exceeding the RS’s high score at the time of processing, signifying higher 
officer quality during the drawdown compared to the buildup.  
Again, different models are not guaranteed to yield the same results due to the 
observations not being identical. It is imperative to conduct a joint test between the two 
models to determine if 0.0088 points are significantly different than zero. Simultaneously 
estimating Models 5 and 6 allows for this joint test. The test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that there is no statistically significant difference in the quality of officers with 
a combat MOS across the buildup vs. drawdown (p-value of 0.1998); thus quality using 
this measure is statistically identical during this period.  
The results of this joint test is not consistent with the primary hypothesis. 
However, this could also be due to the fact that combat RSs did not change their high 
and/or average FITREP scoring across the periods and thus internally prevented inflation. 
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Again, the assumption here is that FITREPS are the best measure of quality and are not 
inflated across periods. As discussed previously, the RV is an alternative measure that 
takes into account inflation occurring due to different RS reporting styles over time. This 
research did not use RVs as measures of quality, but does recommend it as follow on 
research to further validate the primary hypothesis. Nonetheless, the preponderance of the 
estimates here are consistent with the primary hypothesis. 
Table 7.   Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs 
minus the FY Average of RS High between the Two Periods 
    
Model 5: Report 
Average Buildup 
FY07-13 
Model 6: Report 
Average 
Drawdown FY07-




Combat Interacted with 
Buildup (FY07-09) comb_build -0.0491 
 
  
Combat Interacted with 
Drawdown (FY10-13) comb_draw 
 
-0.0403   
  Triple Difference     0.0088 
 
2. Non-Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of FITREPSs 
minus the FY Average of RS High between the Two Periods 
Table 8 displays the results of the change in FY average FITREPS minus FY 
average RS highs (avg_hi) experienced by the non-combat MOS group during the 
buildup and drawdown periods. The full results, with all variables, are reported in 
Appendix C. As with the previous estimates, all other factors in Appendix C (e.g., test 
scores and demographics) are being held constant even as we compare across the 
treatment and control groups. Model 5 estimates results of “avg_hi” for the non-combat 
MOS group were 0.0323 points lower, relative to the control group in the same period. 
During the drawdown, the non-combat group, on average experiences a 0.0173 reduction 
in “avg_hi,” relative to the control group in the same period. 
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A general conclusion about the change in quality between both periods can be 
drawn by taking the difference between both models (triple difference). Table 8 shows 
the effect of having a non-combat MOS on the “avg_hi” during the drawdown minus the 
buildup yields a 0.015 point increase. In other words, the quality of USMC officers as 
measured by the positive change in “avg_hi” is higher in the drawdown relative to the 
buildup.  
Again, different models are not guaranteed to yield the same results due to the 
observations not being identical. Simultaneously estimating Models 5 and 6 allows for a 
joint test between the two models to determine if 0.015 points are significantly different 
than zero. The test rejects the null hypothesis that there is no statistically significant 
difference in the quality of officers with a non-combat MOS across the buildup vs. 
drawdown (p-value of 0.015). Thus, the triple difference of 0.015 points between the 
models is relevant and significantly different than 0. This is consistent with the primary 
hypothesis that quality changed between the periods and the drawdown period had higher 
quality non-combat MOS officers.  
Table 8.   Non-Combat MOS Group Net Change in FY Average of 
FITREPSs minus the FY Average of RS Highs between the two 
Periods 
    
Model 5: Report 
Average Buildup 
FY07-13 
Model 6: Report 
Average 
Drawdown FY07-




Combat Interacted with 
Buildup (FY07-09) non_comb_build -0.0323 
 
  
Combat Interacted with 
Drawdown (FY10-13) non_comb_draw 
 
-0.0173   
  Triple Difference     0.015 
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D. MODEL 7: CANCIAN AND KLEIN 2015 STUDY VALIDATION 
Model 7 is a robustness check of the Cancian and Klein 2015 study which argued 
that USMC officer quality has declined due to a decline in GCT scores. The pertinent 
results can be seen in Table 10, while comprehensive results can be seen Appendix D. 
Note, too, that all other factors in Appendix D are being held constant. The variables 
“_Ify_2005” to “_Ify_2015” represent the percent change in GCT score on average in 
each FY relative to 2004. The results show the scores were declining throughout the 
period, thus verifying Cancian and Klein’s finding that GCT scores had declined. 
Cancian and Klein argue that a reduction in GCT scores corresponds to a reduction in 
officer quality; thus it is important to verify the correlation of GCT scores with output 
based measures of quality, like the FITREP scores used in this research. As shown in 
Table 9, there is a very weak correlation between GCT and “avg_this_rpt” or “avg_hi.” 
While positive, both measures of officer quality have a correlation of less than 0.05 with 
GCT scores. This weak correlation also indicates that GCT scores are not predictive of 
officer productivity and job performance.  
Table 9.   GCT Correlation Matrix 




avg_this_rpt 0.0189 1.0000 
 
  
avg_hi 0.0366 -0.3429 1.0000   
sat 0.0750 0.0666 0.0128 1.0000 
 
Cancian and Klein bases their report on the assumption that GCT is a significant 
measure of officer quality. I argue instead that the best measure of quality is the FITREP, 
since it is the most comprehensive, output-based, and job performance evaluation tool for 
an officer. As seen in Table 9, there is no strong correlation between GCT and qualitative 
variables; therefore, making it difficult to utilize GCT as a measure of quality. This 
research used the FY average FITREPSs for an MRO and interacted it with the FY 
(avg_this_rpt * FY). Using the DiD method, there is not a single year where the FY 
average FITREPSs declined due to a decline in GCT scores. Therefore, Cancian and 
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Klein’s 2015 study is partially correct that GCT scores declined over time. However, 
GCT scores do not comprehensively define the quality of an officer. Cancian and Klein 
did not have the pertinent data to make a definitive statement that officer quality had 
declined.  
Table 10.   Cancian and Klein 2015 Model Results 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 7 
      








































































_IfyXavg_2011 (fy==2011)*avg_this_rpt -0.0648 
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_IfyXavg_2015 (fy==2015)*avg_this_rpt -0.1337** 
    [0.0596] 
 
E. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The models in the previous sections were validated by several robustness checks. 
The data collected from MMRP-30 and TFDW spanned FY04–FY15. The actual buildup 
and drawdown periods were mostly in FY07-FY13. This can be seen in the change in 
officer population in Figure 3. Initially the models included all years FY04–FY15, then 
FY07–FY15, and FY07–FY13. The results for all models were consistent across these 
various samples. Given the robustness of these results, I reported the models using only 
FY07–FY13 as it represents the actual years of the buildup and drawdown to test the 
primary hypothesis. While the precise dates of the buildup and drawdown could include 
adjacent years, FY07–FY13 is representative of the actual periods and the results were 
similar throughout all FYs in the data.  
As additional robustness checks, the models were estimated using alternative 
control groups. The assumption in the main results is that pilots and lawyers make the 
best control group, since their CD selection rates are at or near 100 percent throughout 
the data. To validate this assumption, I created three control groups for testing. As in the 
models above, a DiD model for the buildup and drawdown periods were estimated using 
the alternative control groups. Subsequently, a triple difference was calculated between 
the models to determine the net change of the results between the periods. This allowed 
me to determine if each of the three control groups had similar results. 
First, a control group with pilots and lawyers (control) only was created; these are 
the results reported above. Second, a control group with lawyers only (control_lawyer) 
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was created to determine if the results were consistent with the first. Using the triple 
difference estimate, the results of the lawyers only control group were similar and 
consistent with the first control group. Third, a control group with pilots (control_pilots) 
only was created. Interestingly, the triple difference estimate with pilots only as a control 
group were inconsistent with the first two and the sign of the coefficients were opposite. 
The results showed the USMC became more selective of pilots during the drawdown than 
combat MOS, relative to the buildup. Meanwhile, there was no significant triple 
difference between pilots and non-combat across the time periods. While these results 
suggest lawyers are mostly driving the triple difference results given previously, I still 
felt the control group of pilots and lawyers were consistent and representative of the 
historical CD selection results and chose to keep it as my control group for the main part 
of the analysis.  
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V. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this research is to investigate whether there is a change in the 
quality of USMC officers as a result of the buildup and the subsequent drawdown of 
forces. This was accomplished by using multiple probit and multivariate regression 
models to analyze changes in CD selection and average FITREPs over time. The results 
of this research may be used as a foundation for future conflicts where drastic end 
strength changes may be warranted. It highlights that better methods for shaping the force 
should be researched and implemented due to the trade-off between quantity and quality 
of officers during the drawdown period evaluated.  
I argue that FITREPs are the best available measure of quality for an officer, as it 
is an output-based measure of job performance rather than a measure of input such as 
AFQT or other raw ability measure. First, I find conclusive evidence that CD was more 
selective in the drawdown than the buildup. This should be obvious in the raw 
unconditional figures, since nearly 100 percent of officers were retained in the buildup 
and only 55 percent in the drawdown. Second, I find systematic evidence of an increase 
in the average FITREP score between the periods, even when I examine within USMC 
officers using a treatment-control research design. These findings further solidify the first 
finding that quality increased during the drawdown, although not statistically significant 
for combat MOSs, but still economically relevant. Additionally, the difference between 
the average FITREP score and RS high narrowed between the periods. This signifies 
more FITREPs were written at or above the RS high, further indicating higher officer 
quality in the drawdown. 
Third, I check the validity of Cancian and Klein’s 2015 research which claimed 
that Marine officer quality has declined as evidenced by a reduction in GCT scores. 
Fortunately, their study became mainstream during the writing of this thesis, thus 
allowing me to use my data to test their results. The results of my own analysis were 
conclusive that GCT scores had declined over time; however, officer FITREPs did not 
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and other measures of officer ability such as SAT, ACT, AFQT scores did not. Part of the 
issue is that different officer populations over time are taking and reporting these tests, 
making these input-based measures a complicated metric for evaluating officer quality. In 
fact, using a multivariate regression model with DiD estimators, overall officer quality 
never had a reduction from FY04-FY15 as measured by GCT scores, and there is a weak 
correlation between GCT scores and FITREP scores. I interpret this as evidence that 
Cancian and Klein’s 2015 study is inconsistent with any changes in the actual quality of 
USMC officers for the years 2004 to 2015. 
Buildups and drawdowns of the U.S. military force are necessary for maintaining 
national security. However, military leaders are constrained by presidential and 
congressional end strength decisions and are required to act expeditiously to meet end 
strength mandates by the end of each FY. Even as military leaders serve at the president’s 
will and strive to achieve his decision in the desired manner, it is apparent that they must 
make trade-off decisions between quantity and quality to meet political end strength 
requirements.  
Johnston (2015) discusses the trade-off that the USMC must make between fully 
staffing an infantry unit with enough time to train and become cohesive prior to a 
deployment vs. not (Johnston, 2015, p. 87). This research has identified and quantified 
the trade-off USMC makes between quality and quantity of USMC Officers, with 
quantity being the focus during the buildup, which in turn forces very tight qualitative 
standards during the drawdown. It takes multiple periods to fully mitigate the effects of 
these policies and return the system to a steady state of like-quality officers.  
While the system churns toward a steady state, a significant share of quality 
officers are not retained, but low-quality officers promoted during the buildup are still in 
the system and difficult to remove. Bacolod (2007), analyzes the decline in teacher 
quality due to expanded access to professional jobs for women. Bacolod states, “Thus, 
changes in average relative wages [in teaching vs professional jobs] affect not only the 
decision to enter teaching but also the average quality of teachers” (Bacolod, 2007, p. 
745). The theoretical model presented in Bacolod (2007) has particular implications for 
USMC officer quality. During the drawdown, high-quality officers with attractive 
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alternative labor market opportunities in the civilian sector are the ones most likely to 
accept voluntary separations compared to lower quality officers. 
The Marine Corps rarely incentivizes high-quality officers with early promotions 
that may deter their decision to accept a more lucrative, non-military job. Thus, it may 
become even more difficult to achieve a steady state of officer quality due to secondary 
and tertiary effects of the buildup and drawdown retention policies. In conclusion, a one-
size-fits-all force structuring policy may not create the best quality of officer force, but a 
flexible, precise approach similar to civilian sector policies, may improve the quality of 
officers. Without changes to its current manpower policies, Marine Corps officers may 
mirror the decline experienced in teacher quality.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
I recommend that past practices utilized to grow and reduce the military force be 
examined with particular attention paid to the quality trade-off. The review should ensure 
plans to change the size of the force are done gradually, thus reducing the need for drastic 
retention, assessment, or retirement methods needed on each end of the end strength 
spectrum. Competitive CD may be kept to ensure the lowest quality officers are being 
removed at all times and across all services. Alternatively, competitive CD could be 
removed if the Title 10 requirement for captain promotions were made competitive. For 
instance O-4 and O-5 promotions are 80 percent and 70 percent respectively. A +/- 10 
percent is normally allowed for the services to shape the officer force as needed. Creating 
a 90 percent +/- 10 percent requirement for captains would provide force-shaping 
methods and thwart the need for competitive CD. This would prevent an excess of non-
promotable officers at any rank, reduce the need for drastic force-changing measures, and 
allow the force to be shaped over time. Obviously any changes would have to be 
palatable to congress, since Title 10 would have to be modified. 
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C. FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Correct Population Targeted in Early/Voluntary Separation 
Programs 
This research is concerned with the change of officer quality during drastic end 
strength increases and decreases. If the buildup retains almost all officers and the 
drawdown retains the top 55 percent, then the buildup officers of all quality remain in the 
system during the drawdown. They have likely been promoted into the field grade ranks. 
Incentives must be used to entice a certain target populations to voluntarily leave the 
service. 
It is generally assumed that lower quality officers would likely not accept early or 
voluntary separation packages due to a level of safety or comfort in their current position 
and lack of alternative labor market opportunities. In contrast, high-quality officers would 
be more likely to accept these offers and enter the civilian sector. A study should be 
conducted to analyze the effects of early or voluntary retirement options on the quality of 
the USMC officer corps. This could be conducted with the FITREP data used in this 
study and analyze the net change in quality based on separations codes. This will ensure 
the correct population is being targeted and reduce the loss of quality officers.  
2. RS versus RO Remarks for Officer Advancement 
This research focused solely on the RS evaluations of an MRO. The RS is directly 
subordinate to the RO and the RO is required to evaluate an MRO and either concur or 
not concur with the RS’s evaluation. It is generally accepted that RO comments are more 
valuable for career progression, since a RO is likely to have evaluated more officers 
throughout their career. A study should be conducted to determine whether the remarks 
of the RS and RO are of equal importance for the career progression of an officer. This 
could be conducted by using the FITREP data in this research and evaluate RO and RS 
averages at different milestones in an MRO’s career. The various milestones may be CD, 
promotions, special school selections, and so forth. 
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3. Quality across Race/Ethnicity 
In recent years there has been an initiative to recruit diversity throughout the 
military. This is a very noble cause that seeks to create a culturally diverse professional 
military. The military needs quality, versatile members to fill its ranks. Recruiting 
diversity standards that ignore standards of quality may create a less-capable force. 
Research should be conducted to determine quality disparities between race and ethnicity 
to help determine if the current recruiting constraints are beneficial or harmful. This 
could be conducted with FITREP, race, and ethnicity data. 
4. Relative Value (RV) 
RVs are generated to help prevent inflation by RSs and ROs. The RS or RO must 
evaluate at least three officers of the same rank to gain a RV. A cumulative RV is also 
generated to track the officer’s quality over time relative to their peers. The researcher 
must not forget about the recency effect and the fact that a RS is likely to write a current 
MRO higher than an MRO of past. This research did not use RV due to a lot of missing 
data and the process of creating a FY RV average was not very clean. The FITREP data 
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APPENDIX A. PROBIT MODELS 1 AND 2 COMPARATIVE 
EFFECTS OF THE BUILDUP AND DRAWDOWN ON THE 
PROBABILITY OF BEING SELECTED FOR CAREER 
DESIGNATION 
VARIABLES LABELS 
Model 1: Probit 
Buildup FY07-
FY13 
Model 2: Probit 
Drawdown 
FY07-FY13 
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combat_buildup combat*buildup 0.0248***   
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non_combat_buildup non_combat*buildup 0.0737***   
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buildup FY05-FY09 -0.0904***   
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Model 1: Probit 
Buildup FY07-
FY13 
Model 2: Probit 
Drawdown 
FY07-FY13 

















1=ever assigned to weight 

















































Observations   107,034 107,034 
Standard errors in brackets 




APPENDIX B. REGRESSION MODELS 3 AND 4 ANALYSIS OF 
THE NET CHANGE IN FY REPORT AVERAGES BETWEEN THE 
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1=ever assigned to weight 










































R-squared   0.092 0.092 
Standard errors in brackets 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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APPENDIX C. MODELS 5 AND 6 FY AVERAGE OF FITREPSS 
MINUS FY AVERAGE OF RS HIGH REPORTS BETWEEN THE 
BUILDUP AND DRAWDOWN 
VARIABLES LABELS 
Model 5: Report Average 
Buildup FY07-FY13 
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Model 5: Report Average 
Buildup FY07-FY13 

































1=ever assigned to weight 










































R-squared   0.021 0.021 
Standard errors in brackets 




APPENDIX D. MODEL 7: CANCIAN AND KLEIN 2015 
ROBUSTNESS CHECK 
VARIABLES LABELS Model 7 
      





















































































VARIABLES LABELS Model 7 

































































































VARIABLES LABELS Model 7 










R-squared   0.093 
Standard errors in brackets 
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APPENDIX E. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Variable  Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
fy 172771 2009.986 3.325674 2004 2015 
marital_status 172771 0.731535 0.443162 0 1 
num_dep 172771 1.827546 1.595326 0 13 
mos 172771 1.070839 0.870985 0 2 
sex 172771 0.943046 0.231755 0 1 
cd 172771 0.678476 0.467063 0 1 
act 172771 1.616562 29.04079 0 1520 
lsat 172771 2.762275 40.44129 0 1560 
sat 172771 1550.789 161.439 0 1600 
rifle_class 172771 0.534737 0.498793 0 1 
afqt 172771 23.7724 37.33802 0 99 
dlab 172771 23.24714 43.14962 0 970 
pft_class 172771 0.326583 0.468965 0 1 
swim 172771 0.754982 0.430099 0 1 
weight_control 172771 0.006303 0.079142 0 1 
avg_hi 172771 -0.32453 0.408255 -3.66889 0.345 
avg_this_rpt 172771 2.977357 1.939015 0 7 
xact 172771 0.9715 0.166397 0 1 
xlsat 172771 0.988783 0.105316 0 1 
_sat 172771 0.995184 0.069228 0 1 
sat_sat 172771 1549.572 170.2151 0 1600 
xrifle 172771 0.281772 0.449864 0 1 
xdlab 172771 0.044707 0.20666 0 1 
xpft_class 172771 0.561495 0.496205 0 1 
xswim 172771 0.005603 0.074642 0 1 
gct 172771 124.9104 9.764524 42 160 
buildup 172771 0.439293 0.496302 0 1 
drawdown 172771 0.560708 0.496302 0 1 
control_lawyers 172771 0.033235 0.17925 0 1 
control_pilot 172771 0.31316 0.46378 0 1 
combat 172771 0.236371 0.424854 0 1 
non_combat 172771 0.417234 0.493104 0 1 
combat_drawdown 172771 0.133581 0.340203 0 1 
non_combat_drawdown 172771 0.239236 0.426618 0 1 
combat_buildup 172771 0.102789 0.303684 0 1 
non_combat_buildup 172771 0.177999 0.382513 0 1 
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